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The role of derogations from the ECHR in the current ‘war on 
terror’  
H Fenwick Professor of Law, University of Durham  




This chapter points out that derogation from the ECHR under Article 15 ECHR was designed 
after the second World War precisely to allow contracting states to meet emergencies such as 
the one represented by the current ‘war on terror’, but to remain within the ECHR system, 
while suspending adherence to certain of the rights on a temporary basis. Article 15 allows 
states to cease their adherence to a number of the Convention rights, during the period of the 
emergency. It might be expected therefore that reliance on derogations would be particularly 
significant at the present time. But the chapter finds that very few derogations have been sought 
from ECHR contracting states, despite the recent very significant rise in terrorist activity. Given 
that derogations have played little part in counter-terrorism efforts in most of the ECHR-
contracting states, a significant degree of continued adherence to the ECHR has been 
maintained, but some attention has turned to other methods of exploring evasion of its 
protections. This chapter explores the reasons behind the lack of reliance on derogations, and 
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Global terrorist activity, linked mainly to ISIS and similar groups, is in some respects of a more 
concerning nature than previous manifestations of terrorist activity which have also tended to 
be less widespread. The concern is due to a range of factors: some of it is perpetrated by ‘home-
grown’ terrorists who cannot be deported; the attacks are sometimes of a particularly vicious 
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and also unpredictable nature; there is a lack of likelihood that a political solution can be found 
since negotiation with groups of this nature is, it is argued, not possible. This chapter focuses 
mainly on the contracting states of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
points out that derogation from the ECHR under Article 15 ECHR was designed after the 
second World War precisely to allow contracting states to meet crisis situations of this nature, 
but to remain within the ECHR system, while suspending adherence to certain of the rights on 
a temporary basis. Derogating states would still therefore adhere to the rule of law notions 
embedded in the ECHR, and the Strasbourg Court would still police their responses to 
emergencies, and in particular the proportionality of the response.  
 
Article 15 allows states to cease their adherence to a number of the Convention rights, during 
the period of the emergency. However, no derogation from certain Articles is permitted, as 
discussed below. Article 15 has been used in the past mainly in respect of terrorist activity and 
often to derogate from Article 5, the right to liberty. (To date Albania, Armenia, France, 
Georgia, Greece, Ireland, Turkey and the United Kingdom have relied on their right of 
derogation.) It might be expected therefore that reliance on derogations would be particularly 
significant at the present time. Western democracies are currently facing an unprecedented 
terrorist threat – in terms of its widespread nature - which comes mainly from their own 
citizens, whether from the far right (but the threat appears not to be as great as that from jihadist 
Islamist groups) or from jihadist Islamist groups. A number of terrorist attacks have occurred 
in the last five years in Europe (recent attacks causing the greatest loss of life included the 7 
January 2015 (Charlie Hebdo) and 13 November 2015 (Bataclan etc) Paris attacks, the 14 July 
2016 Nice attack, the 1 January 2017 Istanbul attack and the 22 May 2017 Manchester Arena 
attack) and a number of plots have been foiled. Thus there is a continuing and very serious 
threat that attacks may occur. It stems partly from nationals who have travelled abroad (or 
sought to do so but were stopped) to support ISIS, and have already returned to their own states 
of origin (‘foreign terrorist fighters’ - FTFs); some of those that are still in Syria or other 
conflict zones may now be more likely to return, given that ISIS now holds virtually no 
territory. (In January 2018 it was estimated that 850 UK nationals of national security concern 
had returned from the conflict: HC Deb 31 January 2018 Vol 635 Col 941. Europol (2017) 
reported that in 2016: ‘135 people were killed in jihadist terrorist attacks in the EU. In total 13 
terrorist attacks were reported: France 5, Belgium 4 and Germany 4. Out of these 13 attacks, 
10 were completed. A total of 718 people were arrested on suspicion of jihadist terrorism 
related offences.’ In 2015 the UN Security Council estimated that there were almost 25,000 
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foreign fighters globally, and it was observed that there had been a sharp rise in European 
fighters.)  
 
Since FTFs and other suspects usually cannot be deported, it would be expected that detention 
or control measures requiring a derogation, would be put in place. But as mentioned very few 
derogations have been sought from ECHR-contracting states, despite recent terrorist activity. 
Certain states have recently sought derogations, as discussed below, but nevertheless there has 
been a marked reluctance in general in the ECHR contracting states to rely on derogations.  In 
2018, despite the range of terrorist attacks in 2016-18, only two derogations were in place in 
the contracting states. One was in Turkey, due to an apparent attempted coup. Also on 5 June 
2015 Ukraine notified the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that given the emergency 
situation in the country due to Russian action it intended to derogate under Article 15.    
 
So despite the recent rise in terrorist activity derogations have played little part counter-terror 
efforts in the current ‘war on terror’ in ECHR-contracting states, as this chapter documents, 
but that should not be taken to mean that full adherence to the ECHR is ongoing in the face of 
the attacks and the terrorist threat in general, especially in parts of Eastern Europe. The 
reluctance to derogate may be partly due to the decision rejecting the derogations adopted post 
9/11 in the UK in A and others in 2004, and its counterpart decision at Strasbourg in 2010 (see 
below). Those decisions may have sent a signal to the other states that use of derogations can 
be risky and de-stabilising to counter-terror efforts. Given that derogations have played little 
part in such efforts in most of the contracting states, attention has turned to other methods of 
exploring evasion of the protections of the ECHR, as discussed below.  
 
This chapter will proceed as follows. It will begin by considering the current terrorist context, 
which might appear to invite the widespread use of derogations from the ECHR. Secondly, it 
will examine the stance taken by the Strasbourg Court to the use of derogations, including two 
decisions against Turkey in 2018, and will comment on the likely response of the Strasbourg 
Court to derogations sought in response to the increase in terrorist activity in Europe over the 
last five years. Thirdly it will consider other methods of diminishing the impact of ECHR 
safeguards for fundamental rights, particularly procedural safeguards, via counter-terror 
measures explored recently in Europe (and globally) without relying on derogations, looking 
particularly at the case of the UK. Fourthly it will consider evasion of the ECHR via 
citizenship-stripping. Finally, having explored the general reluctance to rely on derogations, 
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and the contrasting purported reliance on a derogation in Turkey, it will come to some 
conclusions as to the current and future role of derogations from the ECHR, given this position, 
and as to the desirability of relying on derogations in Europe in the current ‘war on terror’. It 
concludes by considering the lessons that can be learnt from this situation, and in particular 
from the rejection of reliance on derogations despite the severity of the current emergency.  
1. The current terrorist context  
 
The threat from ISIS-supporting nationals and from the far-right (far-right extremists 
presenting a threat also tend to be ‘home-grown (Pantucci et al 2016) in ECHR-contracting 
states has led states to consider and introduce an increasing array of counter-terror measures, 
including non-trial-based measures, creating tensions with human rights norms. That tension 
is exacerbated where the terrorism threat comes from a states’ own citizens since usually they 
cannot be deported, as discussed below. Therefore they have to be retained within the borders 
of the contracting states, prompting the search for counter-terror measures that can be used to 
control their activities.  
 
The nature of the terrorist attacks themselves is of especial concern when compared, for 
example, to IRA attacks in the UK. That is, it is argued, for a number of reasons. First, the 
attacks are largely completely indiscriminate; a number of them have made no distinction 
between civilians and soldiers or between children and adults; indeed, children have been 
deliberately targeted (as in the case of the Manchester arena attack in 2017, and in 2018 of 
incitement to murder Prince George at his school (Siddique and Halliday 2018). Secondly, a 
large number of the attacks have involved the suicide of the perpetrators, adding an extra 
dimension of fear and alienation, given that it is harder to deter those who intend to die in 
carrying out an attack. Examples include the March 2016 Brussels Attacks and May 2017 
Manchester Attack. The Manchester arena suicide attack on 22 May 2017 was carried out by 
Salman Abedi using explosives; it killed 22 people, including a number of children, and injured 
over 100 (Kerslake 2018).  
 
Third, the attacks are, to an extent, more difficult to predict than previous attacks, given the 
propensity of the attackers to use ordinary objects such as knives or vans to carry them out, and 
to move abruptly from radicalisation to sudden engagement in terrorist acts. Examples include 
the Westminster Bridge attack carried out by Khalid Masood – who appears to have moved 
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from radicalisation to attack mode rapidly - on 22 March 2017 using a vehicle to run down 
pedestrians and then using knives. 5 people died, and 50 were injured, some of them critically. 
The method was clearly similar to the Nice truck attack carried out by Lahouaiej-Bouhlel on 
14 July 2016 and the Berlin Christmas Market truck attack on 16 December 2016. The London 
Bridge attack in 2017 was carried out by three men, again using vehicles and knives. Khuram 
Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba strapped fake suicide belts to themselves before 
engaging in a marauding-style attack, using a van to run over pedestrians and then stabbing 
people in Borough Market. They killed eight people and injured many more. They appear to 
have intended to kill far more people – blow torches and bottles filled with flammable liquid 
were found in the van that they used; they had also attempted to hire a large lorry to carry out 
the attack, which would almost certainly have caused further deaths/injuries, and it has been 
reported that they may have intended to take hostages to execute them later (see Intelligence 
and Security Committee 2017). Using such objects means that detection is more difficult, since 
the attackers do not need outside training or assistance as they would probably do if assembling 
bombs. (So the comparison is with, for example, the attack planned in Chesterfield at Christmas 
2017: see Dodd and Grierson 2017; see also the 2016 Irish Semtex bomb plot: Young 2017; 
see further Striegher 2013.)  
 
Fourth, the use of the criminal law and criminal justice system is also rendered more difficult 
in the current situation because a decision has to be taken as to the point at which intervention 
should occur when a group or an individual appears likely to engage in an attack. The risk 
cannot be taken of getting too close to that point, but that also means that evidence-gathering 
is made more challenging, because the persons concerned can argue that the plot was a fantasy 
which would never have been carried out. This can be a particular issue when very early-stage 
precursor-offences such as in the UK s58 Terrorism Act (TA) 2000 (possession of information 
useful for terrorism) or s5 TA 2006 (acts preparatory to terrorism) are charged. The dividing 
line between terrorist fantasy and genuine preparation for the commission of a terrorist act was 
central to the case of R v Samina Malik ([2008] EWCA Crim 1450). The case concerned a 
female Muslim who called herself ‘the “Lyrical Terrorist”’; she was initially prosecuted for 
possessing propagandist material but was acquitted on appeal as the judge’s summing up had 
failed to consider adequately whether the documents in question were genuinely useful for 
terrorism (see further below and chap 00, pp 00; Walker 2009). 
  
Fifth, in many European states a very large number of persons have been identified who have 
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been radicalised and might tip over into carrying out an attack (see Home Affairs Select 
Committee 2016; Anderson 2017); it is not possible in terms of the available resources to carry 
out surveillance on all of them (in 2018 in the UK there were over 500 live security operations, 
3,000 ‘subjects of interest’ and a further 20,000 people viewed as possibly posing a threat: 
Home Office 2018), so decisions are constantly taken by the security services and police as to 
whether to down- or up-grade the risk they represent. Sixth, the use of social media and the 
internet can make the task of the security services and police harder because terrorists or would-
be terrorists can receive inspiration from external jihadist groups, can communicate with each 
other via the ‘dark web’ or via less policed sites (see eg UNSC 2015, pp 11-12, 18; Intelligence 
and Security Committee 2017, pp 16-18; less policed sites include eg Telegram), and can also 
download bomb instructions as well as details as to the places they intend to target, relevant to 
mounting an attack. ISIS or Al Qaeda-supporting operatives in various parts of the world, 
including Lebanon, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, are able to communicate via the internet with home-
grown sympathisers in various states, and inspire and facilitate attacks in ECHR-contracting 
states. (The most significant attacks in the UK were perpetrated by British nationals, including 
the 22 May 2017 Manchester Arena Attack which killed 23 and injured 513, the 22 March 
2017 London Attack (Westminster Bridge) killing 5 and injuring 50 using a vehicle a knives, 
and the 7/7 bombing in London. See MacAskill and Johnson (2016), interview with Andrew 
Parker, current Head of MI5: ‘There will be terrorist attacks in Britain’: ‘there are about 3,000 
“violent Islamic extremists in the UK, mostly British”’. The attacks in January 2015 on Charlie 
Hebdo, and at a kosher supermarket, and the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015, were 
organised and perpetrated largely by ISIS-supporters, some of whom had fought with ISIS, and 
almost all of whom were French nationals: see Farmer (2016). The Brussels terrorist strike on 
22 March 2016, the deadliest act of terrorism in Belgium's history, was perpetrated by at least 
3 Belgian nationals (BBC News 2016). The Normandy church attack, 26 July 2016, was 
perpetrated by French citizens, and the Nice truck attacker Lahouaiej-Bouhlel on 14 July 2016 
had a French residency permit.) 
 
The situation described is exacerbated due to the nature of the threat from Salafi-Jihadist 
inspired terrorism which distinguishes it from, for instance, Irish terrorism. In general, the use 
of terrorism invites political, police-based or military solutions; but a political solution to the 
problem of this manifestation of terrorism is not feasible because the aims of Salafi-Jihadism 
are self-evidently irreconcilable with those of democracies. A military solution has already 
been brought about in Iraq and is currently close to completion in Syria (it may also be sought 
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in Libya by the Libyan government to repel ISIS militants: see Ross 2016). But given that ISIS 
and similar groups are about to be entirely ousted via military action from the very small 
pockets of territory they still currently hold, in order to protect the populations in the member 
states, the solution must be a police and security service-based one.  
 
2. Relying on derogations as part of the counter-terror armoury 
 
As indicated, despite the recent racheting up of the terror threat in European states, especially 
due to ISIS-linked plots and terrorist atrocities, the use of measures to combat terrorism 
necessitating reliance on derogations has been conspicuous by its absence. However, if further 
states had sought derogations in the last five years from Article 5 ECHR (right to liberty) to 
protect detention without trial, or to introduce lengthy periods of house arrest likely to create a 
‘deprivation of liberty’, the Strasbourg Court would have been likely to uphold them, provided 
the measures were compatible with the State’s other international legal obligations, depending 
on the precise measures introduced, given the ease with which it is possible to satisfy the 
jurisprudence governing the tests under Article 15, as discussed below (Article 15(1): ‘In time 
of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party 
may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent 
with its other obligations under international law’). In particular, the Court has tended to defer 
to the state’s judgment as to the measures needed to combat a state of emergency in the 
particular circumstances in question. It should be noted that certain rights are non-derogable 
by virtue of Article 15(2), including Article 2 (the right to life), except in respect of deaths 
resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3 (freedom from torture or from inhuman or 
degrading treatment), 4 (1) (prohibition of slavery) and, notably, 7(1), which prohibits 
punishment without law. 
 
The fact that when facing somewhat similar emergencies in the past a state has chosen not to 
derogate would not be relevant to a decision to do so. For example, the UK did not seek a 
derogation at a number of points in recent years when terrorist activity was especially serious, 
although not as serious as at the present time, such as after the Omagh bombing (involving a 
car bomb on 15 August 1998 which resulted in 29 fatalities). Failures to derogate in the past 
are not directly relevant to any current derogation. The existence of a state of emergency is a 
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necessary condition for derogation – it does not mandate it, and a state which seeks to adhere 
to the Convention despite the fact that it could probably defend a derogation at Strasbourg 
deserves credit for doing so. Conversely, derogations should not be sought on insurance 
grounds – on the basis that a state of emergency may soon come into being, and stringent 
measures might suddenly need to be taken.  
 
3.1 How is the term ‘emergency’ understood under Article 15? 
 
Under Article 15 the first question is whether a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation’, within the meaning of Art 15, is in being. The Court has said on this in Lawless:  
 
In the general context of article 15 of the Convention, the natural and customary 
meaning of the words 'other public emergency threatening the life of the nation' is 
sufficiently clear; they refer to an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which 
affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the 
community of which the state is composed” (Lawless v Ireland (No 3) (1961) 1 EHRR 
15 at [28]; see further de Londras and Dzehtsiarou 2018). 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has often been criticised for its stance at this stage, given 
that it has only once found that a claim for a derogation is unjustified on the basis that such a 
state of emergency does not exist. Therefore it can be argued that its understanding of the term 
‘emergency’ undermines Article 15’s attempt to balance the requirements of security and 
rights.  For example, Greene criticises the jurisprudence for failing to draw a clear line between 
normalcy and emergency, with the result that he finds ‘the requirement that a state of 
emergency be declared [to be] little more than an administrative procedure’ which enables the 
erosion of human rights protections (Greene 2011). 
 
The one exception was the Greek Case ((1969) 12 YB 1): an emergency was not found to be 
in being in the very special circumstances of that case. It was found:  
Such a public emergency may then be seen to have, in particular, the following 
characteristics: (1) It must be actual or imminent; (2) Its effects must involve the whole 
nation; (3) The continuance of the organised life of the community must be threatened; 
(4) The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions, 
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permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, are 
plainly inadequate ([153]).  
A very strict standard was applied in that case; a very narrow margin of appreciation was 
conceded to the state, a very narrow degree of discretion (see eg: Spielmann 2014; Legg 2012; 
Letsas 2006) due to the special circumstances pertaining in the situation: there had been a coup 
d’etat and the military had seized control of the state, suspending part of the constitution and 
declaring a state of emergency. The strict stance was taken due to the fact that a military 
government was in power, and the European Commission on Human Rights considered that it 
was resorting to Article 15 in bad faith. Applying that narrow margin, ([201]) the Commission 
found that the derogation was not justified. The Greek government had argued that there had 
been a steady decline in public order which had brought the nation almost to a state of anarchy, 
necessitating the adoption of various measures, including the derogation, in order to prevent a 
Communist takeover. The Commission, abjuring a stance of deference to the state on this 
matter, disagreed with the government’s assessment of the situation, finding that the life of the 
nation was not threatened. Strasbourg therefore found that there was no public emergency and 
thus no valid grounds to derogate.  
 
The situation in the Greek Case may be contrasted with the derogation sought by the Turkish 
civilian administration in 2016 in response to an attempted military coup. The situation in 
Turkey was, taken at face value, the reverse of the one in Greece. The Turkish civilian 
administration was threatened with a take-over by a military coup, led by parts of the Turkish 
armed forces. In order to take various measures in response, as discussed below, Turkey sought 
a derogation under Article 15. In two cases in 2018, Mehmet Hasan Altan v Turkey (application 
no. 13237/17) and Sahin v Turkey (application no. 16538/17) the Court of Human Rights found 
that “the attempted military coup and its aftermath have posed severe dangers to the democratic 
constitutional order and human rights, amounting to a threat to the life of the nation” and, 
noting the broad margin of appreciation accorded to the state in relation to the judgement that 
such a threat existed (Mehmet Hasan Altan, para 87), accepted that the derogation was relevant 
to its assessment of the merits of the applicant’s complaint (ibid, paras 91-91).  
 
On very different facts, in Lawless v Ireland ((1961) 1 EHRR 15) the Court of Human Rights 
had also found that a state of emergency was in being in considering whether Ireland was 
justified in entering a derogation under Art 15 to Art 5. It found that any terrorist threat must 
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affect the whole state, must be in being or be imminent, and must have produced a situation in 
which the usual law enforcement mechanisms are unable to function. It found that these 
conditions were satisfied in 1957 due to the existence of a “secret army” operating in Ireland 
and in the UK, and because of the alarming rise in terrorist activities in the previous year:  
in the first place, the existence in the territory of the Republic of Ireland of a secret 
army engaged in unconstitutional activities and using violence to attain its purposes; 
secondly, the fact that this army was also operating outside the territory of the State, 
thus seriously jeopardising the relations of the Republic of Ireland with its neighbour; 
thirdly the steady and alarming increase in terrorist activities from the autumn of 1956 
and throughout the first half of 1957 ([28]). 
The existence of a secret army was found to affect the whole population and relations with its 
neighbouring state, the UK, were severely affected. Also there had been a steady and alarming 
increase in terrorist activity due to the increasing readiness of the IRA to use violence to attain 
its purposes. The state of emergency was inferred from these factors – as opposed to finding 
that it was due to the actual level of violence – so the requirements were not literally applied: 
it was not found that the whole nation had to be directly affected.   
 
The later decision in Ireland v UK (Series A, No. 25 (1971)) made it clear that the limits on the 
court's powers of review are particularly apparent where Article 15 is concerned due to the 
wide margin of appreciation that would be extended to the state:  
 
It falls in the first place to each contracting state, with its responsibility for 'the life of 
[its] nation', to determine whether that life is threatened by a 'public emergency' and, if 
so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to overcome the emergency. By reason 
of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the 
national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to 
decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of 
derogations necessary to avert it. In this matter, article 15(1) leaves those authorities a 
wide margin of appreciation…. 
 
Nevertheless, the states do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect. The Court, 
which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the observance of the states' 
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engagements (article 19), is empowered to rule on whether the states have gone beyond 
the 'extent strictly required by the exigencies' of the crisis. The domestic margin of 
appreciation is thus accompanied by a European supervision. ([207])  
 
Unsurprisingly, a derogation from Article 5 was upheld in Brannigan and McBride v UK 
((1993) 17 EHRR 539) in the context of 3000 deaths attributable to terrorism, caused by over 
40,000 terrorist shooting or bombing incidents between 1972-1992. In a fairly similar situation 
in Aksoy v Turkey ((1996) 23 EHRR 553) the Court accepted that there was a state of 
emergency in South-east Turkey on the basis that there had been on average 3000 deaths related 
to terrorism a year.  
 
Moreover, while the Strasbourg Court may be prepared to make its own assessment of the 
situation, albeit while conceding a wide margin of appreciation to the state, which means that 
it makes little attempt to gather independent evidence, it is placed in a particularly difficult 
position where a government enters a derogation on partially speculative grounds, based on 
very sensitive intelligence. The Court may be unable to make any real assessment if the 
intelligence is viewed as largely undisclosable. It is clearly easier for the Court to make a 
(tentative) assessment – albeit not one based on close scrutiny - where terrorist activity has 
already occurred and is continuing, than when intelligence sources suggest, on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence, that it may occur. That was the situation which arose in A and others 
v UK ((2009) 49 EHRR 29). The legislation in question was the Anti-Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act 2001 (ACTSA) which inter alia introduced detention without trial (in Part 4) for 
suspect non-nationals. It was introduced shortly after 9/11 on the basis that Al Qaeda 
sympathisers were already in the UK, and some of them were attempting to incite others to 
terrorist acts. Nevertheless, terrorist acts had not been carried out in the UK at that point by 
such sympathisers. The hasty introduction of ACTSA is illustrative of the tendency of 
legislators to be pressured too readily into passing anti-terrorism laws hastily, with much too 
little scrutiny and amendment (see: Ramraj et al 2011, p 119; Ackerman 2006). The detention 
without trial measure was incompatible with Article 5 ECHR and therefore required a 
derogation under Article 15.  
 
The Strasbourg Court accepted in A and others v UK that in introducing a derogation in respect 
of Part 4 ACTSA a political decision had been made as to whether an ‘emergency’ was in 
being; the decision was found to relate to the institutional competence of the executive. The 
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Attorney General, representing the Home Secretary, had submitted previously in the House of 
Lords that an emergency could properly be regarded as imminent if an atrocity was credibly 
threatened by a body such as Al-Qaeda which had demonstrated its capacity and will to carry 
out such a threat, where the atrocity might be committed without warning at any time. He 
further argued that the Government, ‘responsible as it was and is for the safety of the British 
people, need not wait for disaster to strike before taking necessary steps to prevent it striking’ 
(A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 [25]). He also 
submitted that the judgment on this question was pre-eminently one within the discretionary 
area of judgment reserved to the Secretary of State and his colleagues (ibid [39]). The 
importance of deference to the judgement of the government was also argued before Strasbourg 
in A and Others v UK ((2009) 49 EHRR 29 [150]).  
 
The applicants argued in A v UK that there had been no public emergency threatening the life 
of the British nation when ACTSA was introduced, for three main reasons: ‘first, the 
emergency was neither actual nor imminent; secondly, it was not of a temporary nature; and, 
thirdly, the practice of other states, none of which had derogated from the Convention, together 
with the informed views of other national and international bodies, suggested that the existence 
of a public emergency had not been established’ (ibid, [175]). Thus the applicants interpreted 
the wording in Art 15 as regards an ‘emergency’ as requiring a threat to the organised life of 
the community which went beyond a threat of serious physical damage and loss of life.  
However, the Court found that in previous cases it had been prepared to take into account a 
much broader range of factors in determining the nature and degree of the actual or imminent 
threat to the “nation”. Also it pointed out that it would allow the state in question a broad 
margin of appreciation on that issue.  In that instance it found that weight also had to be attached 
to the view of the national courts on the matter – the House of Lords in A and others had also 
found that a state of emergency was in being.  
 
If the Court could accept fairly readily that a state of emergency was in being in 2001 due to 
the 9/11 attacks, although, while there were Al-Qaeda sympathisers in the UK, terror attacks 
in the UK itself had not occurred, it would clearly accept that a state of emergency was in being 
in European states between 2013-18 when a number of attacks have taken place in Europe. 
Obviously the point at which a state sought a derogation would be relevant to the severity of 
the emergency, but the decision in A and others v UK indicates clearly that had derogations 
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been sought by a number of European contracting states in those years to aid in combatting 
terrorism, this first test would have been found to be satisfied.  
 
3.2 Are the measures taken ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ (the 
proportionality analysis)?    
 
Once it is found to be the case, taking the margin of appreciation conceded to states into 
account, that an emergency was in being in respect of a derogation, then the Court must 
consider the question of proportionality (this requirement, in addition to the requirement that 
only certain rights may be derogated from, has been termed the ‘substantive requirement; see 
eg de Londras and Dzehtsiarou 2018). The assessment of whether a measure is strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation by the Court of Human Rights obviously requires weight to 
be given to ‘the nature of the rights affected by the derogation, the circumstances leading to, 
and the duration of, the emergency situation’ (Brannigan and McBride v UK (1993) 17 EHRR 
539 [43]; A and others v UK (2009) 49 EHRR 29 [173]; Harris et al 2014). In coming to a 
conclusion as to whether a measure is strictly required, the Court has found that it will assess 
the merits of such a claim (Mehmet Hasan Altan v Turkey (application no. 13237/17) [94]; 
Sahin Alpay v Turkey (application no. 16538/17) [78]; see also European Court of Human 
Rights Directorate of the Jurisconsult 2018) and the severity of the ‘emergency’ is obviously 
relevant to the nature of the powers taken, at this second stage. 
 
Initially it appeared, as evidenced in certain decisions, including Brannigan, that the Court 
would take the view that the margin of appreciation conceded would not differ at this second 
stage. But in more recent cases – Aksoy, A and others v UK – a change in that stance became 
apparent and the margin appears to have narrowed at the second stage, enabling the Court to 
come to a judgment differing from that of the member state. That stance was confirmed in 
Sahin Alpay v Turkey and Mehmet Hasan Altan v Turkey both in 2018.  
 
In Lawless the introduction of special powers in Ireland, including internment in 1971 
(detention without trial for IRA members), necessitated a derogation from Article 5; the 
applicant was an Irish citizen detained without trial for 5 months in 1957 because he was a 
member of the IRA. The powers were found to be justified on the basis that the use of the 
ordinary law was found to be insufficient to meet the challenges created by the state of 
emergency caused by an upsurge in terrorist activity, together with serious and prolonged 
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rioting (Ireland v UK A 25 (1978) [23]), and also because the powers were found to have been 
used for the purpose of meeting the emergency; further, their use was subject to a number of 
safeguards, including referral of disputed cases to a quasi-judicial commission (Ireland v UK 
A 25 (1978) [36-38]). Furthermore, it was found to be significant that the need for the 
derogation was kept under review (ibid, [54]). However, had the situation still fallen within the 
category of an ‘emergency’ under Art 15, but been found to be at the less serious end of the 
spectrum denoted by that term, possibly the nature of the powers might not have been found to 
be justified. 
 
The powers at issue in Brannigan and McBride v UK ((1993) 17 EHRR 539) were not of such 
a significant nature. The Government had introduced special powers to deal with terrorist 
suspects: they could be held for 48 hours and the time period could be extended by the state 
for up to 5 days. The powers required a derogation from Art 5(3) which requires that after arrest 
a suspect must be brought ‘promptly’ before a judge.  In other words, a person could only 
remain in police detention for a certain period without judicial authorisation of the continued 
detention. When the applicant challenged the derogation the Court found, as discussed above, 
that there was a public emergency, but went on to consider whether the measures taken were 
“strictly required” by the exigencies of the situation. The Government argued that, within the 
framework of the common-law system, it was not feasible to introduce a scheme which would 
be compatible with Article 5 para 3 (ibid, [51]) and yet would not weaken the effectiveness of 
the response to the terrorist threat. It was pointed out that the training of terrorists in remaining 
silent under police questioning hampered and protracted the investigation of terrorist offences. 
Therefore, in consequence, the police were required to undertake extensive checks and 
inquiries; they therefore needed more time to retain terrorist suspects in detention. It was also 
argued on behalf of the UK that involving the judiciary in the process of granting or approving 
extensions of detention created a real risk of undermining their independence as they would 
inevitably be seen as part of the investigation and prosecution process. The Court granted the 
UK a very wide margin of appreciation – it stated that it was not its role to substitute its view 
as to the measures that would be most appropriate or expedient at the relevant time to deal with 
an emergency situation, and emphasised the state’s duty to protect the Article 2 (right to life) 
and Article 3 (prohibition of torture) rights of its citizens who could become potential victims 




Furthermore, the Court accepted that the measure was a ‘genuine response’ to the situation 
(ibid, [51]). The Court also noted that the Government had the direct responsibility for 
establishing the balance between the taking of effective measures to combat terrorism on the 
one hand, and for respecting individual rights on the other (ibid, [59]). It was also accepted that 
in the context of Northern Ireland, where the judiciary was small and vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks, public confidence in its independence was understandably a matter to which the 
Government had attached great importance. The Court concluded that in the light of those 
considerations it could not be said that the Government had exceeded its margin of appreciation 
in deciding, in the prevailing circumstances, against judicial control (ibid, [60]). 
 
But those findings in Brannigan can be contrasted with the findings in Aksoy v Turkey ((1997) 
23 EHRR 553), which also concerned a derogation from Article 5(3) in a terrorist situation. In 
that instance the applicant was detained for at least fourteen days without being brought before 
a judge or other judicial officer. That period was longer than the one at issue in Brannigan and 
McBride. The Government sought to justify the measure by reference to the particular demands 
of police investigations in a geographically vast area faced with a terrorist organisation receiv-
ing outside support.  The Court said that it had accepted, as it had also expressed in the past, 
that the investigation of terrorist offences clearly presents the authorities with special problems 
(ibid, [78]). Nevertheless, the Court did not accept that it was necessary to hold a suspect for 
fourteen days without judicial intervention. The Court found that that period was exceptionally 
long, and left the applicant vulnerable, not only to arbitrary interference with his right to liberty, 
but also to torture, and emphasised the lack of effective judicial oversight which could protect 
against such mistreatment in detention (ibid, [76-78]). The Government, it was found, had also 
failed to adduce any detailed reasons before the Court as to why the fight against terrorism in 
South-East Turkey rendered judicial intervention impracticable (ibid, [78]). Thus, although 
Turkey was allowed a margin of appreciation in relation to the determination as to the measures 
to be taken, the lack of safeguards available – such as, for example, no prompt remedy of 
habeas corpus nor legally enforceable rights of access to a lawyer (ibid, [81]), and the length 
of detention without judicial intervention - (ibid, [83]) was found to mean that Turkey had 
exceeded its margin of appreciation: the derogation was not therefore upheld.  
 
The House of Lords in the UK reached a similar conclusion in A and others (A and Others v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56). The derogation in question 
was intended, as indicated above, to cover the introduction of detention without trial under Part 
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4 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ACTSA). ACTSA was rapidly passed in the 
Commons, despite its introduction of draconian powers (see Fenwick 2002). The performance 
of the US Senate in relation to the US PATRIOT Act, also passed in response to September 
11th, and also providing for the detention of foreign nationals without trial, as well as numerous 
other controversial extensions of state power, likewise disclosed virtually no will to resist such 
encroachments upon civil liberties: just one Senator voted against the proposals. The 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) in the UK had already concluded 
that even if the requisite state of emergency existed, it doubted whether the measures in the 
Bill could be said to be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, bearing in mind the 
array of measures already available to be used against terrorism, and the fact that no other 
European country had derogated from Article 5 (Joint Committee on Human Rights 2001). It 
returned to this issue in its Sixth Report on the Bill and found that the case for a derogation had 
still not been made to Parliament (Joint Committee on Human Rights 2004; see also 2003). 
Other legal opinion on this issue at the time was quite firmly to the effect that the derogation 
was unjustified on the basis that the measures taken went further than was required by the 
exigencies of the situation (see eg Anderson and Stratford 2001, for the group JUSTICE on 
this issue, which came to the conclusion that the derogation was unjustified, considering that 
Part 4 went beyond what was strictly required by the exigencies of the situation in covering a 
wide range of suspected international terrorists). 
 
Having found, deferring to the expertise of the executive on the matter, that a state of emer-
gency was in being at the time in question (by a majority), the Lords then considered the ques-
tion of proportionality under Art 15. The House of Lords was invited by the Attorney General 
to defer generally to the view of the Government on the necessity for the detention without trial 
measure under the 2001 Act. The House refused and drew a clear distinction between the first 
and second issues under Article 15. The question whether there was a ‘public emergency threat-
ening the life of the nation’ was something, it was found, which was primarily for the Govern-
ment to decide, subject to a fairly restrained review by the courts: that was on the basis of the 
Government’s expertise in assessing intelligence and levels of threat (A and Others v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 [27]-[29]). But in contrast, the Lords 
found, the proportionality of the measures required to combat that threat, and in particular 




The Lords accepted the argument that the measures did not satisfy the test of proportionality 
on a number of grounds. Sections 21 and 23 ACTSA did not, it was found, rationally address 
the threat to the security of the United Kingdom presented by Al-Qaeda terrorists and their 
supporters, on three grounds. Firstly, the powers did not address the threat presented by UK 
nationals, and there was no evidence that the threat posed by nationals was clearly lower than 
that posed by non-nationals. Secondly the sections permitted foreign nationals suspected of 
being Al-Qaeda terrorists, or their supporters, to pursue their activities abroad if there was any 
country to which they were able to go. Thirdly, the sections on their face permitted the certifi-
cation and detention of persons who were not suspected of presenting any threat to the security 
of the United Kingdom as Al-Qaeda terrorists or supporters. Part 4 potentially could have cov-
ered groups entirely unconnected to Al Qaeda, including groups, such as the PKK, who have 
apparently renounced violence and in any event have not committed acts of terrorism in the 
UK (see R (on the application of the PKK) v the Home Secretary [2002] EWHC 644). Part 4 
on that basis should have been designed to be applicable only to members or supporters of Al 
Qaeda, and other violent groups with similar aims, given that it was introduced to combat the 
threat emanating from such groups post 9/11. 
 
The House of Lords therefore found that the measures were both under- and over-inclusive, 
and were not therefore suitable to achieve the security objective in question.  Part 4 was found 
to be too broad to be covered by the derogation since it went further than strictly required by 
the exigencies of the situation, given that the threat posed by national suspects could apparently 
be addressed without resorting to detention without trial. The deference paid to the executive 
was more minimal at the second stage under Article 15 since the Lords found that the 
determination to be made at that stage was not to be viewed as a political judgement but as a 
judicial one since it concerned proportionality; in that sense the Lords created differentiation 
between the two stages under Art 15. The Lords then made a declaration of incompatibility 
between Part 4 ACTSA and Articles 5 (right to liberty) and 14 ECHR (right to freedom from 
discrimination on a number of grounds including nationality) under s 4 Human Rights Act 1988 
(HRA). That did not affect the legal force of the scheme, but the then Labour government 
eventually abandoned it to introduce control orders instead, as discussed below. 
 
Those who had been subjected to detention without trial then brought a claim to the Strasbourg 
Court in A v UK ((2009) 49 EHRR 29), one aspect of which concerned obtaining compensation 
for their detention, given that it had been found to be unlawful. As mentioned above, the first 
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test under Article 15 was found to be satisfied – it was accepted that an emergency had been in 
being. But the Strasbourg Court then went on to consider whether the Part 4 measures had been 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. The Court reiterated that when it comes to 
consider a derogation under Art 15, it allows the national authorities a wide margin of appre-
ciation to decide on the nature and scope of the derogating measures necessary to avert the 
emergency. Nonetheless, it is ultimately for the Court to rule whether the measures were 
‘strictly required’. On that point the government put forward a number of new arguments which 
were not put forward domestically in A and others. It defended the confining of the measures 
to non-nationals, on the basis that the government was seeking to take into account the sensi-
tivities of the British Muslim population in order to reduce the chances of recruitment among 
them by extremists. However, the Court found that the Government had not placed before the 
Court any evidence to suggest that British Muslims were significantly more likely to react 
negatively to the detention without charge of national rather than foreign Muslims. The gov-
ernment also argued that the state could better respond to the terrorist threat if it were able to 
detain its most serious source, namely non-nationals. In that connection, again the Court found 
that it had not been provided with any evidence which could persuade it to depart from the 
conclusion of the House of Lords that the difference in treatment was unjustified. Thus the 
Court took the same stance as the House of Lords had taken - that the measures were not strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, despite the fact that there was evidence that the 
applicants had had some involvement in terrorism.  
 
Thus the conclusion of both the House of Lords and the Strasbourg Court was that the choice 
by the Government and Parliament of an immigration measure to address what was essentially 
a security issue had had the result of failing adequately to address the problem, while imposing 
a disproportionate and discriminatory burden of indefinite detention on one group of suspected 
terrorists. It is fairly clear that the Court was in effect guided towards that conclusion due to 
the stance on the issue of proportionality that had been taken in the national court.  
 
The Court in Mehmet Hasan Altan v Turkey (application no. 13237/17) and Sahin v Turkey 
(application no. 16538/17) reaffirmed the approach to the margin of appreciation and the stance 
taken as to the question of whether the measures taken were ‘strictly required’ in A and others 
v UK (Mehmet Hasan Altan v Turkey [91]; Sahin Alpay v Turkey [75]). Mehmet and Sahin were 
both journalists critical of the government. Both applicants were subject to criminal 
proceedings on the basis of contravention of Article 309 of the Criminal Code – attempting to 
19 
 
overthrow the constitutional order – due to their alleged connections to and sympathies with 
the Gulenist movement, despite there being no evidence linking them to the coup attempt, nor 
to active participation in the Gulenist movement. Mehmet had been held in pre-trial detention 
for over a year prior to being sentenced to life imprisonment (subject to ongoing appeals) and 
Sahin had been held for a similar period, although his trial had yet to be heard at the time of 
the Court judgment (Mehmet Hasan Altan [25]; Sahin Alpay [12-13]. Both Mehmet and Sahin 
involved claims of compensation for a lengthy period of pre-trial detention. The Turkish 
Constitutional court, taking a stance similar to that of the House of Lords in the UK in A and 
others, had also accepted that there was a ‘public emergency’ within the terms of Article 15 
(Mehmet Hasan Altan [93]; Sahin Alpay [77]), but had also gone on to find that that the 
measures were not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. Since the derogation was 
found to be invalid domestically, a violation of the applicants’ Article 5(1) rights was found 
(Mehmet Hasan Altan [110]; Sahin Alpay [119]).  
 
The Court of Human Rights had regard to these findings. Unlike A and others, however, in 
which the UK’s derogation referred to specific measures of pre-trial detention, in Mehmet and 
Sahin the derogation did not refer to such measures (Mehmet Hasan Altan [89]; Sahin Alpay, 
[73]). Another crucial distinction was that in Mehmet and in Sahin there was no or limited 
evidence that the two applicants had had any involvement in terrorist activity, and therefore 
the Court found that the pre-trial detention was not ‘lawful’, nor effected ‘in accordance with 
a procedure prescribed by law’ due to the lack of reasonable suspicion, and on that basis could 
not ‘be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ (Mehmet Hasan 
Altan [140]; Sahin Alpay, [119]). So the derogation was not found to justify the treatment of 
the applicants in Sahin or Mehmet on proportionality grounds. The Court thus found violations 
of Article 5 (deprivation of liberty). In this regard the European Court agreed with the Turkish 
Constitutional Court’s finding in relation to Article 5(1) that ‘if it were accepted that people 
could be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed an 
offence, the guarantees of the right to liberty and security would be meaningless’ (Mehmet 
Hasan Altan [36]; Sahin Alpay, [32]).  
 
In Mehmet and in Sahin the Court of Human Rights also considered the question of whether 
the interference with the applicants’ Article 10 (freedom of expression) rights was justified as 
a measure ‘strictly necessary’ due to the exigencies of the situation. This issue was raised 
because the imposition of pre-trial detention had been linked explicitly to both applicants’ 
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critical statements about the government in relation to the events leading up to and in response 
to the coup (Mehmet Hasan Altan [25]; Sahin Alpay, [22]). The Court considered that:  
 
…even in a state of emergency – which is, as the Constitutional Court noted, a legal 
regime whose aim is to restore the normal regime by guaranteeing fundamental rights… 
the Contracting States must bear in mind that any measures taken should seek to protect 
the democratic order from the threats to it, and every effort must be made to safeguard 
the values of a democratic society, such as pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness 
(Mehmet Hasan Altan [210]; Sahin Alpay, [180]).  
 
The Court observed that detention of journalists in part for publication of articles and providing 
commentary created a ‘chilling effect’ on the press (Mehmet Hasan Altan [212]; Sahin Alpay, 
[182]). The Court of Human Rights therefore found a violation of Article 10 in both cases. In 
contrast to the determination of the House of Lords in A and others, the Constitutional Court 
had awarded compensation, albeit a limited sum, to the victims in both cases and had instructed 
the local Assize Court to approve the release of both claimants. This remedy was taken into 
account by the Court of Human Rights, particularly in relation to Article 5(4), but on the other 
hand the Assize Court had refused to accept the Constitutional Court’s judgment, thus 
depriving it of legal force. In striking contrast to A and others the Court of Human Rights in 
Mehmet and Sahin awarded a higher level of non-pecuniary compensation to the victims, 
despite its finding that an emergency situation existed, largely because of the lack of evidence 
that either applicant was associated with terrorism or otherwise with violent opposition to the 
state. The applicants in Mehmet and Sahin were granted €21,500 in non-pecuniary damages 
(Mehmet Hasan Altan [220]; Sahin Alpay [190]).  
 
3.3 Conclusions as to Strasbourg’s stance under Art 15 
 
It is argued in conclusion that the margin of appreciation conceded at Strasbourg on the 
‘emergency’ point means that it is hard to challenge the state’s view as to the measures needed 
to combat the threat, and in most cases, until recently, once the emergency point was conceded, 
so was the point as to the measures needed to combat the emergency. However, in Aksoy, in A 
v UK, and in Mehmet and Sahin that was not the case; so it can tentatively be suggested that 
the Court is showing a greater determination to scrutinise the measures taken; it is subjecting 
them to a more intensive review, having reduced the margin conceded on this issue. A divide 
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between the width of the margin conceded as to making a determination as to an ‘emergency’ 
and the margin conceded regarding the proportionality analysis is becoming apparent. 
Nevertheless, the tests under Article 15 remain reasonably easy to satisfy where actual terrorist 
activity has occurred.  So, for example, had Part 4 ACTSA targeted national and non-national 
suspects, and had been introduced in the wake of terrorist activity carried out partly by ‘home-
grown’ terrorists, as occurred in the UK in 2017, it is probable that the Supreme Court (which 
has replaced the House of Lords) and Strasbourg would have reached a different conclusion as 
to the proportionality of the measures adopted. Given the ease with which the Article 15 tests 
would probably be satisfied in the current situation, it is therefore of interest to explore the 
reactions of the contracting states to the terrorist attacks over the last 4-5 years, which have in 
most instances not included reliance on a derogation. 
3.4 The minimal role of derogations in the ‘war on terror’  
  
The reluctance of the contracting states to seek derogations from the ECHR post 9/11, and even 
in the face of the increase in terrorist activity in Europe in 2015-18, may have been influenced 
by the case of the UK. As discussed above, immediately post-9/11 reconciliation between 
reliance on a non-trial-based measure and human rights law was sought by use of a derogation 
from the ECHR in 2001. That reconciliation failed since detention without trial under Part 4 
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ACTSA) for non-national terrorist suspects was 
abandoned, after the House of Lords invalidated the derogation in A and others (A and Others 
v Secretary of State for the Home Dept (2004) UKHL 56) on grounds of proportionality, and 
the Strasbourg Court later confirmed that finding. But, as discussed, terrorist activity in Europe 
has escalated since then, and therefore derogations would be more likely to be upheld. 
Nevertheless, despite the escalation in ISIS-inspired terrorism in Europe in the last few years, 
very few states have sought derogations, bar France and Turkey.  
 
France instituted a number of emergency measures (etat d'urgence) in 2015 after the Paris 
attacks accompanied by a derogation from Article 15 ECHR. (The French Government 
decided, by Decree No. 2015-1475 of 14.11.15, to apply Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on 
the state of emergency. Decrees No. 2015-1475, No. 2015-1476, No. 2015-1478 14.11.15, No. 
2015-1493, No. 2015-1494 18.11.15, and Law No. 2015-1501 20.11.15 defined a number of 
the measures that could be taken by the administrative authorities. See No. 2015-1476, No. 
2015-1478 of 14 November 2015, No.2015-1493 and No. 2015-1494 of 18 November 2015, 
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and Law No. 2015-1501 of 20 November 2015. The state of emergency was extended to 26 
May, and the government then extended it to the end of July 2016 to cover the Euro 2016 
football championship and the Tour de France. The state of emergency was extended and 
renewed again on 15.12.16 for an additional seven months and finally extended for a further 
three months on 11.7.18. See note verbale from the Permanent Representation of France, 24 
November 2015, registered at the Secretariat General on 24 November 2015.)  
 
The Constitutional Reform Bill (to create changes to Article 16 and 36) came before the Senate 
in France on 10.2.16 and a clear majority of MPs in the lower House of Parliament approved 
the measures. They were intended to enshrine the state of emergency powers into the 
constitution, allowing a government to call on the powers in a time of crisis. The expanded 
emergency powers allowed the government to impose immediate house arrest without 
authorization from a judge, if persons were considered a risk; impose traffic restrictions, and 
prohibitions on public assembly; to order closure of public spaces; power to requisition 
property; prohibition of entry into or residence of certain persons; conduct searches without a 
judicial warrant and seize any computer files found, and to block websites deemed to glorify 
terrorism without prior judicial authorization. These powers created interferences with the 
rights to liberty, security, freedom of movement, privacy, and freedoms of association and 
expression and so required the derogation under Article 15. The length of the state of 
emergency was criticised by Amnesty International (Perolini 2017; Aoláin 2017) but France 
eventually abandoned the derogation on 1st November 2017 (Boring 2016). 
 
Turkey’s recent reliance on a derogation contrasts strongly with that of France in a range of 
respects. A group of members of the Turkish armed forces attempting to seize power in Istanbul 
on 15th to 16th July 2016. The attempted coup involved soldiers in an attack on several key 
State buildings, including Parliament and the Presidential compound; the Chief of General Staff 
was captured and taken as a hostage (Mehmet Hasan Altan v Turkey (application no. 13237/17, 
[15]). It was reported that more than 300 people were killed during the coup and 2,500 people 
were injured. The Turkish government alleged that the coup attempt was linked to Fetullah 
Gülen (ibid, [16]) and allegedly master-minded by the Gulenist terrorist group. On 21 July 
2016 the government declared a national state of emergency pursuant to Article 120 of the 
Turkish Constitution of 1982 to last for three months, which was subsequently extended (most 
recently on 18th April 2018) but abandoned – at least formally – on 19 July 2018. After 
introducing the state of emergency Turkey formally notified the Council of Europe that it 
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intended to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights under Art 15. (It is a 
requirement under Article 15 that the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe must be 
notified as to the derogation.) There was also a notification to the United Nations in Aug 2016 
concerning derogation from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
under Article 4, regarding Articles 2/3, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26 and 27). But 
unusually, no specific domestic measure was identified in the notices as regards the ECHR or 
ICCPR, such as detention without trial, and no Article of the Convention, as opposed to the 
notification in respect of the ICCPR, was identified as having been derogated from (see Mehmet 
Hasan Altan [81]). 
 
But the actions taken in Turkey, including arresting and imprisoning thousands of academics 
and journalists, could not be covered by a derogation from Articles 5 or 10, as the Strasbourg 
Court found in the 2018 cases considered above, because they were clearly disproportionate to 
the threat in question. So it appears that Turkey failed to adhere to the ECHR in a range of 
respects, and although it has openly declared that that is the case via the derogation, its 
engagement with the demands of Article 15, and of the ECHR in general may be viewed as a 
tokenistic one. The situation is precisely the one that Article 15 was designed to avoid. So while 
the vast majority of the ECHR-contracting states have not sought a derogation in the face of 
the ‘war on terror’, the most significant recent terrorism-related derogation in existence in a 
contracting state relates instead to an attempted internal coup, and shows little allegiance to 
ECHR values. The lessons to be drawn from this situation are considered below; this chapter 
now turns to considering measures contracting states have taken to counter terrorism which 
have to an extent evaded ECHR protections without an open declaration that that is the 
intention.  
3. Recalibrating rights rather than seeking a derogation  
 
3.1 Introduction  
The UN Security Council has called on member states to tackle the problem represented by 
terrorist groups operating in Iraq and Syria. It has said that member states should: …prevent 
and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to 
a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, 
planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of 
terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities…’. It went on to stress: 
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‘the particular and urgent need to implement this resolution with respect to those foreign 
terrorist fighters who are associated with ISIL, Al-Nusrah Front and other cells, affiliates, 
splinter groups or derivatives of Al-Qaida…’ (UNSCR 2014).  
 
The threat from ISIS supporters and ISIS-supporting returnees, while far from the only form 
of terrorism threatening the contracting states (see the references to Northern Irish and extreme 
right-wing terrorism in David Anderson, 2014; Charles Anthony, 2016; the threat appears not 
to be as great as that from Islamic groups: David Anderson, 2016), has been partly responsible 
for the introduction and consideration of liberty-invading non-trial-based executive measures 
in European contracting states post 9/11, intensifying in the years 2015-present as the threat 
from ISIS-supporting nationals has increased (Amnesty International 2017; also note the 
suggestion by Schneier (2009) that some counter-terror measures may make people feel more 
secure without having any real function in increasing security). Clearly, such measures tend to 
be in tension with domestic and international human rights law. Thus, the post-9/11 years have 
seen an increasing struggle in the contracting states (see Ramraj et al 2011) to reconcile human 
rights norms with reliance on non-trial-based counter-terror measures. But while, as explored 
below, they are likely to create tensions with such norms, they have often been presented as 
reconcilable with them, via recalibrations of human rights, as was necessitated by control 
orders and similar measures which have spread from the UK to other contracting states 
(Amnesty International 2017). In the UK the early ‘heavy touch’ control orders (see Secretary 
of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] 3 WLR 642) appeared to demand a minimising 
reinterpretation of certain rights, in particular Article 5, in effect emptying the right of part of 
its content or implying new exceptions into it. In 2009 a Report on global terrorism Assessing 
Damage, Urging Action (International Commission of Jurists 2009) identified this trend in the 
UK and other countries in the face of terrorism (see further Fenwick 2011). 
 
Thus, there have been a number of attempts in the contracting state to minimise the impact of 
ECHR safeguards for fundamental freedoms in respect of counter-terror measures rather than 
seeking a derogation. As mentioned above, to control the activities of suspects whom it may 
not be possible to deport (since they are often nationals) and also in answer to this resolution, 
a number of member states have introduced non-trial-based measures recently, but the majority 
of them have not sought a derogation. Thus, the measures have fallen short of the most 
repressive ones that could be introduced, including detention without trial, introduced in the 




4.2 Recalibration of Article 5  
 
Non-trial-based executive control measures unaccompanied by a derogation are to an extent 
hard to reconcile with human rights law, meaning that a down-grading recalibration of rights 
may tend to occur. The UK was the first European state to introduce such measures, but 
recently, as pointed out by Amnesty in a Report on counter-terror measures in 14 European 
countries, a number of other member states have followed suit, or are about to do so (Amnesty 
International 2017). The Report found that the adoption of various pieces of legislation has 
resulted in a downgrading of safeguards for rights to privacy, expression and liberty across 
Europe, disproportionate to the terrorist threat (p 19). It also found that EU states in general 
had failed to uphold human rights’ standards in the face of securitisation concerns (at pp 6, 19). 
Amnesty International further noted in its Report that ‘In a number of states, emergency 
measures that are supposed to be temporary have become embedded in ordinary criminal law’ 
contrary to the temporarily and operationally limited understanding of derogations in the 
context of the ECHR and other international human rights instruments (chap 1). The Report 
highlighted the specific issue of control-orders and related measures (pp 48-56), as well as the 
use of citizen-stripping measures, and measures that temporarily exclude suspected foreign 
fighters from the country, discussed in Section 4 below.  
 
The phenomenon of recalibration of rights will therefore be considered using the example of 
the UK. As discussed, the UK introduced a derogation post 9/11 from Article 5 in order to 
introduce derogation without trial for non-national international terrorist suspects, under Part 
4 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. A further non-trial-based measure emerged 
unaccompanied by a derogation after detention without trial was abandoned in 2005 (as 
discussed, after the derogation was declared invalid by the House of Lords in A and others 
([2004] UKHL 56; for comment on the case, see: Hickman 2005; Hiebert 2005). The 
replacement measure took the form of control orders applicable to suspect nationals and non-
nationals alike under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA). Section 1(1) PTA defined 
a ‘control order’ as ‘an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes 
connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.’ Under s 1(3) a 
control order could impose ‘any obligations that the Secretary of State or the court considers 
necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that individual 




Control orders, and the measure that replaced them in 2011 - Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Orders (TPIMs) under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 
2011, as amended by Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 Part 2 - are non-trial-based 
executive measures which have provided the model for the introduction of such measures in a 
number of the ECHR contracting states in Europe. (See Chap 00 in this volume for further 
discussion of TPIMs.) The 2017 Amnesty report criticised ‘the regional trend [in Europe] of 
using such measures instead of charging and prosecuting people in the criminal justice system’ 
(at p 48). As discussed further in Chap 00 (pp00), they are imposed by the Home Secretary, 
with court review, on a low standard of proof and enable individuals to be subjected to 
significant restrictions on liberty, including house detention, but not to imprisonment. Chap 00 
(pp00) also discusses derogating control orders under the PTA, which would have allowed for 
imprisonment without trial, but they were never activated in the UK. Measures on the control 
orders model rely on targeting terrorist suspects to curtail their liberty without the need for a 
trial, by imposing specific restrictions on them, related to the particular types of activity it is 
thought that they might engage in (due to previous behavior), with the aim of preventing future 
terrorist activity before it occurs.  
 
Control orders as non-trial-based counter-terror measures were designed to approach or 
possibly over-step the limits of human rights’ law, in particular of the substantive rights to 
liberty under Article 5 ECHR and to private life under Article 8. But in so doing they had to 
rely on interpretations allowing a minimising recalibration of such rights, since, as indicated, 
the choice was made not to accompany the measures with a derogation. Since control orders 
were declared to Parliament to be compatible with the ECHR under section 19 Human Rights 
Act 1998, the repressive nature of the early control orders indicated implicit reliance on a 
recalibrated, attenuated version of Article 5 ECHR, able to accommodate to the needs of the 
crisis. They imposed a range of restrictions including 18 hours house detention a day and forced 
relocation under so-called ‘heavy touch’ control orders (see Fenwick 2011). The courts were 
impliedly required to reinterpret Article 5 in a minimising fashion in relation to the content of 
control orders and to do the same in respect of Article 6 in respect of the process of reviewing 
them. Minimising human rights via reinterpretation, rather than openly departing from them 
via a derogation, implies that a re-balancing between societal needs and individual rights 
should occur, in effect emptying the right of part of its content via a derogation by stealth. 
Under that approach the executive argument tends to be that the purpose of counter-terrorism 
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measures should be taken into account in re-determining the ambit of the right in question or 
the standards demanded under it. In 2009 a Report on global terrorism of the International 
Commission of Jurists identified this trend in the UK and other countries in the face of terrorism 
(p 91).  
 
Recalibration of rights includes exploiting gaps and ambiguities in domestic and international 
human rights law in order to rely on attenuated or minimised versions of the rights as 
necessitated by the nature of the non-trial-based measures in question. Control orders relied in 
particular on a minimised notion of the concept of ‘deprivation of liberty’ under Article 5 
ECHR in presupposing that they did not create such a deprivation in imposing lengthy periods 
of house detention, combined with other restrictions. But in response the courts relied on 
Article 5 ECHR as scheduled in the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) to bring them into closer 
compatibility with the ECHR (see Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] 3 
WLR 642). The modifications brought the control orders scheme into closer compliance with 
both Articles 5 and 6 ECHR, meaning that the scheme itself became in various respects, less 
repressive. In particular, it was found that 18 hours house detention a day, combined with other 
restrictions would breach Article 5 ECHR, so shorter periods had to be imposed deemed not to 
create a deprivation of liberty (see in particular the decisions in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v JJ [2007] 3 WLR 642 and Secretary of State for the Home Department v B and 
C [2010] 1 WLR 1542). It was also found under Article 6 (the fair trial right) that in reviewing 
the imposition of the control order, the gist of the case against the controlee had to be disclosed 
to him in the proceedings (that was determined in the context of the ACTSA in A v United 
Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29 (Grand Chamber) and applied to domestic law in relation to 
control orders in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) [2007] 3 WLR 681).  
 
Although the UK courts’ response to the control orders’ scheme meant that it had to be 
modified to achieve greater ECHR-compatibility, albeit this time without rejecting it wholesale 
(see in particular Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2010] 3 WLR 51), the 
courts also partially acquiesced in the notion of finding that the ECHR could accommodate the 
scheme by accepting a somewhat recalibrated version of Article 5. Since significant 
interferences with liberty without trial – although not as significant as originally imposed - had 
been accepted by the courts as compatible with Article 5, such interferences could then be 
viewed as having received judicial endorsement. That included some acceptance of up to 16 
hours a day house detention (Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] 3 WLR 
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642 [105]). That could be combined with forced relocation where no special features 
particularly ‘destructive of family life’ arose (Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
AP [2011] 3 WLR 53 [19]-[24]). The facts of Guzzardi v Italy ((1981) 3 EHRR 333) at 
Strasbourg (discussed below), in which a deprivation of liberty was found, quite strongly 
resemble those in AF, a control orders case (SSHD v AF [2009] UKHL 28): AF’s house 
detention was for 14 hours, so it was significantly longer than Guzzardi’s, but he was restricted 
to a geographical area of 9 square miles, significantly larger; he had to wear an electronic tag 
and was also subject to similar, perhaps more far-reaching, restrictions on association and 
communication. AF was also subject to repeated house detentions for a longer period than was 
Guzzardi – more than 16 months. But no deprivation of liberty was found.  
 
A somewhat recalibrated version of Article 6 could also be said to have emerged, given the 
acceptance that modified proceedings to impose the orders was compatible with Article 6 (see 
Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) v MB (2007) UKHL 46). So a 
scheme in 2005 compatible with the ECHR only on the basis of presupposing a narrow 
interpretation of Articles 5 and 6, was transmuted into a modified version of itself by 2011 that 
came closer to achieving such compatibility. Thus reconciliation with human rights law was 
achieved by relying on a degree of recalibration of the rights, although not of the extensive 
nature demanded by the initial iteration of the scheme.  
 
While in the UK the control orders scheme was abolished in 2011, and replaced by a ‘light 
touch’ scheme under TPIMs as a much ‘softer’ version of control orders, in other states 
schemes on the control orders model are being introduced, without being covered by a 
derogation. So it is worth considering whether such schemes do necessitate a derogation, due 
to the damage done to certain Strasbourg concepts if they are introduced and operated without 
one. The acceptance by the UK courts and at Strasbourg (the Strasbourg decisions below (not 
taken in the context of a war on terror) indicate that a deprivation of liberty under Art 5 will 
not necessarily be found to arise due to certain constraints on a persons’ liberty - partial house 
arrest, other geographical restrictions) that a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 will not 
necessarily arise where measures controlling the movement of suspects, including partial house 
detention, are introduced, appears to have encouraged other contracting states to introduce 
similar measures, as detailed in the Amnesty International (2017) report, discussed above (chap 
1). Those measures have spread and are spreading across Europe, but they have not been 




4.3 Strasbourg’s stance as to the ‘deprivation of liberty’ concept 
 
It is clear that the Strasbourg case-law supports the proposition that in the paradigm case of 
deprivation of liberty, most obviously imprisonment, no further enquiry is necessary: a 
deprivation of liberty has occurred; the question is whether it can be justified under the Article 
5 exceptions, where liberty can be taken away. It is also reasonably clear that house arrest for 
24 hours – complete confinement, albeit in the home, not in a state-run place of detention – is 
a deprivation of liberty (Mancini v Italy App no 52970/99 [17]; Nikolova v Bulgaria (No 2) 
App no 40896/98, 30 December 2004 [60]; see also Vachev v Bulgaria (App no 42987/98, 8 
October 2004) [64]; NC v Italy (App no 24952/94, 11 January 2001 [33]), and this will be the 
case even where the house arrest is not directly being enforced via direct coercion and physical 
restraint: Pekov v Bulgaria (App no 50358/99, 30 June 2006). 
 
It is in the non-paradigm cases of interference with liberty, where an issue as to the existence, 
brevity, or intensity of the confinement arises, that a focus on four factors identified in Guzzardi 
apply (they were confirmed in the decision in Storck v Germany (App no 61603/00, (2006) 43 
EHRR 96 para 74; the context of Storck was very different – it concerned lack of consent to 
periods of time in a psychiatric institution). In Guzzardi it was found that the starting point is 
the ‘concrete situation of the individual’. Then the four factors must be considered; they are: 
the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. The 
control order cases, bearing in mind the varying restrictions imposed, clearly fall into the non-
paradigm category since none of them concern – or could concern - complete imprisonment 
(such orders would necessitate a derogation from Article 5).  
 
How has Strasbourg employed the Guzzardi approach in cases concerning measures reasonably 
analogous to control orders?  An 11 hour curfew from 9pm to 7am was imposed in Raimondo 
v Italy ((1994) 18 EHRR 237) as a supervisory measure; the applicant could leave the house 
with permission if he had valid reasons for doing so. The restrictions were found not to prevent 
him living a normal life and so did not deprive him of his liberty. Similarly, in Ciancimino v 
Italy ((1991) 70 DR 103) the applicant was obliged not to leave the district without first 
obtaining authorisation, to report to the police daily, and was subject to a curfew from 8pm to 
7am (11 hours). This was also not viewed as amounting to a deprivation of liberty under Article 
5. In a further case, Trijonis v Lithuania (App no 2333/02, 17 March 2005) the applicant was 
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subject to a similar curfew and house detention of 23 hours per day for the whole weekend, 
meaning that he could spend time at work. Again no deprivation of liberty was found. One of 
the factors that may have affected the reasoning may have been that Italy and Lithuania at the 
time had ratified Protocol 2, Article 4, and therefore protection was available against 
restrictions on movement falling short of deprivation of liberty. There also appeared to be a 
stronger prospect than in the control order instances in all of those cases of successfully 
challenging the regime imposed, and so the element of potentially indefinite restriction was of 
lesser weight.  
 
In Guzzardi itself, greater emphasis was placed on the cumulative impact of the range of 
restrictions in relation to the life the applicant otherwise would have been living (see also Engel 
v The Netherlands (1976) 1 EHRR 647). Guzzardi was confined on a small island for 16 
months; he was ordered to remain in an area of 2.5 square kilometers; he had to remain in his 
home (which was dilapidated) for 9 hours; he had to seek permission to make phone calls or 
have visitors. The house detention was not the core issue in the finding of the Court that in 
some respects the treatment complained of resembled detention in an ‘open prison’, and 
amounted to a deprivation of liberty. 
 
It should be noted that when Guzzardi was decided Italy had not ratified Protocol 2. Ashingdane 
v UK ((1985) 7 EHRR 528) re-emphasises the point that the core obligation of confinement 
should not be given overwhelming weight since the applicant was confined in a closed 
psychiatric hospital with high security (the restraints included barred windows and a high 
perimeter fence; he was only able to visit his family twice in 7 years), but then moved to an 
open hospital, was free to go home 4 days a week and free to leave the hospital, provided he 
returned at night. The Court found that he had undergone a deprivation of liberty during his 
stay in both institutions. 
 
The express argument for creating a new balance between the individual right to liberty and 
societal concerns (recalibration of the concept of deprivation of liberty) has been rejected in 
the context of Article 5 at Strasbourg in relation to the first post-9/11 preventive strategy. In A 
v UK ((2009) 49 EHRR 29) – the case brought against the UK by the Belmarsh detainees 
detained without trial under Part 4 ACTSA, claiming compensation for their detention - the 
government sought to rely upon the recurring purposive argument already encountered, but in 
that instance, rather than seeking to rely on the proportionate nature of the measure in question 
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in order to argue that it lay outside the ambit of Article 5 (which would have been futile in the 
context of a paradigm case of deprivation of liberty),  the government argued instead that the 
exceptions under Article 5 should be broadened due to the terrorist context, an argument that 
the Eminent Panel of Jurists (2009) found that a number of governments were seeking to use. 
The UK government argued that the principle of fair balance underlies the whole Convention, 
and reasoned therefore that Article 5(1)(f) - the arguably applicable exception, allowing for 
detention pending deportation - had to be interpreted so as to strike a balance between the 
interests of the individual and the interests of the state in protecting its population from 
malevolent aliens. Detention, it was argued, struck that balance by advancing the legitimate 
aim of the state to secure the protection of the population without sacrificing the predominant 
interest of the alien to avoid being returned to a place where he faced torture or death. The fair 
balance was further preserved, it was argued, by providing the alien with adequate safeguards 
against the arbitrary exercise of the detention powers in national security cases (A v United 
Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29 [148]).  
 
The Court said that it did not accept the Government's argument that Article 5(1) permits a 
balance to be struck between the individual's right to liberty and the state's interest in protecting 
its population from terrorist threat. It said that the argument was not consistent with the Court's 
jurisprudence under Article 5(f), or with the principle that paras (a) to (f) ‘amount to an 
exhaustive list of exceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of these exceptions is 
compatible with the aims of Article 5’. The Court further said that ‘if detention does not fit 
within the confines of the [exceptions] as interpreted by the Court, it cannot be made to fit by 
an appeal to the need to balance the interests of the state against those of the detainee’ (ibid, 
[171]).  
 
It seems therefore clear that Strasbourg is unreceptive to the argument that broader exceptions 
can be read into Article 5 by reference to the notion of creating a new balance between the right 
to liberty and security interests in the terrorist context. Thus some measures on the control 
orders model introduced in contracting states appear to need a derogation to protect them. 
Instead, more covert means of evading ECHR safeguards for fundamental freedoms via 
recalibrations of rights have been explored, as discussed. This chapter turns now to a further 




4. Citizenship-stripping  
 
In introducing counter-terror measures, the member states owe international law obligations to 
other States, and are subject to positive obligations imposed on States by UN Security Council 
resolutions in relation to terrorism. (See also Joint Committee on Human Rights 2015; 
Professor Goodwin-Gill said, ‘a State which excludes its own nationals is resorting to a 
unilateralism which is at odds with the collective endeavour of international rights protection 
as well as internationally agreed efforts to counter terrorism’ (ibid, paras 3.4, 3.5).  See further 
UN Security Council Resolution 688 (S/2014/688).) If a terrorist suspect is stripped of 
citizenship and then deported to a non-ECHR state (or is already in that state when the 
citizenship-deprivation occurs) he/she cannot – or is less able to – rely on the ECHR against 
the sending state. The UK Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2013) reported a significant 
increase in the use of deprivation powers, in part due to British citizens travelling to fight in 
Syria, finding that in most cases, the deprivation orders had been issued whilst the individual 
was overseas. Use of citizenship-stripping has become much more prevalent in Europe (and 
globally) recently as an aspect of the escalating war on terror, and offers another means of 
evading ECHR safeguards for fundamental freedoms without seeking a derogation. Amnesty 
International has instanced Temporary Exclusion Orders and citizenship-stripping in the UK 
as examples of disproportionate measures (2017, pp 53, 62-63). 
 
Reliance on citizenship deprivation to protect security is currently being introduced and 
explored in a range of democracies, including the ECHR-contracting states (Zedner 2016). But 
states have not sought to issue citizen deprivation orders against mono-nationals who are 
suspected terrorists even when facing an influx of FTF returnees, and even in the face of the 
terrorist attacks in Europe in 2015-17. In the UK, citizenship can be stripped from a national if 
their actions are ‘seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK’, and they are a dual 
national or if ‘the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is 
able, under the law of a country or territory outside the UK, to become a national of such a 
country or territory’ under the British Nationality Act 1981 s40(4A), (s4A(c)). (The 
Immigration Act 2014 s66 had inserted s4A.) Under the latter provision, in other words, the 
person must have a reasonable prospect of attaining another nationality. Therefore persons 
covered by those provisions can be stripped of citizenship and have their passports withdrawn 
while inside or outside the UK. The conduct of nationals who have fought with or supported 
ISIS or similar groups would clearly fall within the ‘seriously prejudicial’ provision, but they 
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would retain citizenship unless one of the conditions as to nationality applied. Under s66(2) ‘in 
reaching a decision to deprive on those grounds, the Home Secretary can take into account 
conduct which took place prior to the section coming into force’. The provision as to a 
‘reasonable prospect of attaining another nationality’ over-turned the principle from Al-Jedda 
v SSHD ([2013] UKSC 62, [2013] WLR(D) 371 [34]) to the effect that an individual with only 
a hypothetical past or future claim to a nationality may not be stripped of citizenship. 
 
In France, the Constitutional Reform Bill 2016 considered measures for removing citizenship 
from French mono-nationals who were convicted as terrorists in the wake of the 2015 Paris 
attacks; while a clear majority of MPs in the lower House of Parliament approved the measures, 
they were ultimately abandoned. The Constitutional Reform Bill came before the French 
Senate on 10 February 2016 and included the removal of citizenship from French national 
convicted terrorists, but they were abandoned on 30 March 2016 after criticism from the 
President’s own party. Australia introduced powers to deprive dual nationals of citizenship on 
security grounds under the Australian Citizenship Amendment (Allegiance to Australia) Act 
2015. Canada has also passed legislation allowing the government to deprive dual nationals of 
citizenship for security reasons under the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act 2014. Dual 
nationals convicted on terror charges in Belgium face losing their Belgian citizenship, while 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain have similar laws. 
 
The provisions governing citizenship deprivation are designed to create at least face-value 
compatibility with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15(1), providing that 
everyone has the right to a nationality. Article 15(2) provides: ‘No one shall be arbitrarily de-
prived of his nationality’ (see Adjami and Harrington 2008). Compatibility with the 1961 Con-
vention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which provides measures to prevent the creation of 
new cases of statelessness, has – it appears – been achieved by the UK provisions since the UK 
has entered a reservation to Article 8 allowing for the deprivation of the nationality of a natu-
ralised person, now covering the deprivations mentioned above, where the national has a rea-
sonable prospect of acquiring another nationality. (See Immigration Act 2014 Explanatory 
Notes: commentary on s66.) Article 8(1) in particular provides: ‘A Contracting State shall not 
deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless’. The reser-
vation to Art 8(1) was made under Article 8(3). Article 7 is intended to prevent citizens re-
nouncing citizenship except in certain circumstances (see Gibney 2014). Thus, while democ-
racies have so far stopped short of introducing schemes capable of excluding their own terrorist 
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suspect mono-nationals from the country, the use of citizenship-stripping against dual nationals 
is proliferating globally, and provides a means in the contracting states of avoiding the ECHR 




It is concluded that the role of Article 15 ECHR is diminishing despite the recent steep rise in 
terrorist activity in many of the ECHR-contracting states. Therefore it is argued that current 
counter-terrorism debate needs to consider more openly the impact of non-trial-based liberty-
invading measures within the solution to the current terrorist threat in order to question whether 
there is a case for openly seeking a derogation to protect such measures. It should be asked 
whether, given the principles underlying the current conception of international human rights 
law, the cost of relying on such measures without a derogation from Article 5 is out of 
proportion to their value since they tend to lead to recalibration of the concept of ‘deprivation 
of liberty’. Such debate should consider whether, in the face of a range of terrorist threats, 
including that from ISIS-inspired home-grown terrorism, it is necessary to reconsider relying 
on a range of iterations of non-trial-based measures as an alternative, in some instances, to 
reliance on the criminal justice system. (Enhanced TPIMs could represent one such possibility; 
they are already available to be introduced in the ETPIMs Bill 2012 but unaccompanied by a 
derogation, but have not yet been introduced. Since they largely replicate ‘heavy touch’ control 
orders they arguably require a derogation for the reasons given: see also Chap 00, pp00.) If so, 
it is necessary to accept openly that there is a case for contending that they should be covered 
by a derogation, which also requires that they should be non-discriminatory and proportionate 
to the specific threat emanating from members and supporters of ISIS and similar groups, as 
well as far-right secular groups. Use of a derogation would be more transparent than relying on 
the other methods considered here of reconciling such measures with human rights law, and 
less likely to lead to normalisation of such measures (see eg Nugraha 2018). A derogation must 
be openly declared and therefore is less insidious in eroding rights-adherence than the stealthy 
avoidance of human rights laws via recalibrations of rights or by seeking to place suspects 
outside the area of a state’s jurisdictional responsibility.  
 
Use of a derogation would also show respect for the mechanisms international human rights 
law has provided for crisis situations, to allow for use of restraining measures even against a 
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state’s own citizens. Availability of derogations under the ECHR (and other international 
human rights’ instruments) means that states are encouraged, even when facing crisis 
situations, to remain within the ECHR system rather than considering withdrawal from the 
Convention by denouncing it. But the derogation is still policed by the Court, and as seen in 
Aksoy, A v UK, Mehmet and Sahin, is not always accepted (although the Court was to an extent 
guided by the higher domestic courts in reaching its conclusions in three of those instances). It 
is arguably preferable for states to derogate rather than repudiate the ECHR or to water down 
rights covertly; derogations represent a transparent, non-permanent departure from rights 
within limits. Use of a derogation in the face of terrorist activity and a continuing severe 
terrorist threat avoids creating an appearance of adhering to rights while in practice attempting 
to dilute them via their recalibration. It may be preferable to declare openly that a departure 
from rights is occurring due to the emergency for a limited period, as occurred in France, as 
discussed, for a fairly short period of time, following a number of terrorist attacks.  
 
Reliance on derogations when a state is or perceives itself to be in a state of emergency means 
that it remains within the ECHR system, and that the actions of the state still retain legitimacy 
(including satisfying the needs of transparency) since it can only derogate to the extent, and for 
the period of time, that will satisfy the demands of proportionality under Article 15, and that 
judgment may ultimately to be made by the Strasbourg Court. If a derogation was continued 
after the point when the state of emergency had diminished those demands would not continue 
to be satisfied. But reliance on derogations means following the system of derogations set out 
in Article 15 – the converse of the current position Turkey appears to be in in relation to Article 
15 and the ECHR in general. Turkey has purported to remain within the Convention system by 
relying for a period on a derogation, but the connection between the emergency caused by the 
attempted military coup, and the widespread arrest and detention of journalists, academics and 
others apparently linked to Gulenism, is not apparent. Even if it was apparent, such arrests 
would not be viewed as a proportionate response to the emergency. 
   
Despite these advantages of the reliance on derogations, this chapter has explored the question 
why, in the face of the current and increasing terrorist threat in Europe, derogations have not 
on the whole been sought, so derogations have not played a pivotal role in the ‘war on terror’ 
in Europe. Had derogations been sought in many ECHR-contracting states in the last 4-5 years 
to protect detention without trial for suspect terrorists, they would probably have been upheld 
at Strasbourg on the basis that a state of emergency in Article 15 terms was in being in those 
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states. That would have been found to be the case in a number of such states in the sense that 
terrorists attacks had already occurred and also a number of plots were foiled during 2013-18. 
(Over the past 5 years, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the UK have foiled as 
many as 25 Islamist-linked plots: see Intelligence and Security Committee 2017; Home Office 
2018a) As argued, there has been over the last 10 years a reluctance to rely on the most 
repressive measures necessitating use of derogations against a state’s own citizens, but it is 
home grown Salafi-jihadist inspired terrorism that is a key current concern. The tension 
between such reluctance, and the need to address the threat emanating from a state’s own 
nationals explains, it is argued, the nature of the devices discussed, intended to allow for 
evasion of the full rigor of international human rights law, in particular the ECHR, but without 
openly derogating from it. But, as discussed, reliance on such evasion may lead to under-use 
of the measure, and protracted court action, continued tension with human rights law and an 
insidious undermining of respect for such law in the UK and elsewhere. 
 
It is fair to say that although the risk of terror attacks may be over-stated by governments and 
the media (see Ramraj 2005), and the human rights of suspects can be portrayed as ‘a gamble 
with people’s safety’ (Loader 2007), that has not led in the last five years to a rush in most of 
the contracting states to deploy derogations to introduce the most draconian measures. This 
chapter has considered the argument for the open use of derogations as opposed to the use of 
more covert methods of evading the impact of the ECHR and ICCPR, and concludes that 
Article 15 is not fulfilling the role it was originally intended to have since it is either largely 
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